Mackinder, a geographer in the United Kingdom, is considered to be the first important geopolitical thinker. His heartland theory assumes that the particular power that controls the Eurasian landmass would eventually control the global politics and master the universe. In his characterization, land powers are more likely to lay claim to regional and global hegemony than maritime powers.

Geopolitics in its early stages was closely associated with Germany’s foreign policy practices, a latecomer in the struggle for building colonial empires across the globe (Dodds, 2007). Friedrich Ratzel and Karl Haushofer are the most notable German geopolitical thinkers and their thoughts on geopolitics profoundly shaped foreign policies of Nazi Germany during the interwar years and Second World War. The impact of their thought on Nazi Germany’s policies was so decisive and pernicious that geopolitics had been for a long time associated with Hitler’s Germany and considered to be an intellectual exercise serving Hitler’s goals to institute German hegemony across the globe. Rather than geopolitics being recognized as a respectable field of academic study, even the word of geopolitics was avoided in writings on international relations. Hitler’s policies gave a bad reputation to geopolitics. It took some time to recognize geopolitics as a distinct academic discipline.

To Ratzel and Houshofer, states are like living organisms that require lebensraum, viz. living spaces, to survive in the anarchical international environment.

To Ratzel and Houshofer, states are like living organisms that require lebensraum, viz. living spaces, to survive in the anarchical international environment. Just as individuals require a healthy body and mental condition, states are also in need. In the first stage of geopolitical thinking, geopolitics was understood as an objective scientific exercise whose primary reason was to offer ironclad statements on the impact of geographical location and physical terrain on the ability of states to maximize their power in international politics. To this view, states like living organisms that require living spaces to survive in the anarchical international environment. Just as individuals require a healthy body and mental condition, states are also in need of fertile and defensible physical terrain as well as robust and uncontaminated people to survive in international politics. The second generation of geopolitical studies came to the fore following the end of the Second World War. It was mainly an ideological competition between liberal capitalist countries of the western bloc and the communist countries of the eastern bloc. Third generation geopolitics began with the end of the Cold War rivalry between two opposing power blocks adopting diverging political ideologies. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the unification of Germany in 1990 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 epitomized the end of ideological geopolitics.

The second generation of geopolitical studies came to the fore following the end of the Second World War. Throughout the long Cold war years, the US-led Western camp was in bitter ideological competition with the Soviet Union-led eastern camp. The major faultiness between the two opposing power blocks was ideological. The parties competed with each other as to whose political economic model would triumph across the globe. Ideology and identity were the main signifiers of their geopolitical competition. This era in geopolitical studies is also called ideological geopolitics (Gray and Sloan, 2013).

Until 2008, the rise of China was not central to American strategic considerations and the European Union was at the apex of its power. The security concepts of Americans and Europeans alike demonstrated optimism and self-confidence in western capitals. Neither the national security strategies adopted by the George W. Bush and Obama administrations in the US nor the firstever security strategy document of the EU adopted in 2003 mentioned great power competition and ideological polarization as potential threats to liberal international world order. Many circles in the West took comfort in Fukuyama’s thesis that the history came to an end with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and with the growing appeal of liberal-capitalist democracy as the only game in town. Fukuyama was basically saying that from the dissolution of the Soviet Union onwards the erstwhile non-capitalist societies would gradually become part of the US-led liberal capitalist world order because the end of the Cold War left them only with this option. The Cold War was decisively won by the liberal capitalist camp and the years ahead would not witness any ideology-driven geopolitical competition among great powers.

Even though the 9/11 attacks on the US homeland dented the image of the United States as the omnipotent global hegemon and criticisms of the American approach to the global war on terror intensified following the US occupation of Iraq, it was primarily following the financial crisis of the late 2000s that a sense of decline began to percolate down to the western elites in the United States and EU members.
The gradual shift from uni-polarity to multi-polarity has set the scene for fourth generation of geopolitical competitions among great powers. Since 2008, there have been disputes all over the world over the values of multiculturalism, openness, tolerance, and universal human rights. The morality of universal cosmopolitanism has gradually given way to the morality of relative communitarianism as rising nonwestern powers, primarily China and Russia, have increasingly offered non-western conceptualizations of international political order.

Geopolitical understandings of different time periods tend to demonstrate diverging conceptualizations of power. Power is closely related to geopolitics. For example, while first and fourth generation of geopolitical competitions underline the primacy of hard power calculations and behaviors in relational relations, second and third generation of geopolitics tend to put more emphasis on soft power. Critical geopolitics would on the other hand say that it is not easy to separate hard power from soft power and states employ a mix of all power capabilities and relations in their efforts to justify their geopolitical view and claims. That said, a brief discussion on the concept of power would be meaningful in this context.

This dimension of power prioritizes capabilities of actors in a non-relational fashion. In this sense, some states are defined as hard powers, meaning that the tangible power capabilities at their disposal would enable them to influence the behaviors, interests and values of other states. Hard power capabilities can be of both military and non-military in nature. Therefore, a more apt categorization would be how these military and non-military capabilities would be employed to have an impact on others. Which particular logic would shape the actions of power-holder?

Persuasive soft powers are those that think they need to invest some capital in order to help create legitimacy and attraction in the eyes of others. They develop specific strategies not only to brandish their achievements but also persuade others that their behaviors and policies are legitimate and other-regarding. In this regard, persuasive soft powers take great pains in helping manufacture attraction in the eyes of targeted countries through the employment of diplomatic means of conflict resolution, public diplomacy efforts, development aids and multilateral and facilitative diplomacy at interstate and intrastate disputes.

Another close relationship exists between geopolitics and geo-economics. Differentiating between the use of geography for political goals and economic goals is not an easy exercise to do because political and economic motivations of states are very much intermingled with each other. The best example to offer in this regard is China’s One-Road-One-Belt Initiative.

What lies at the roots of geopolitical thinking is the never-ending process of attributing an overarching meaning to physical geography (O Tauthail and Dalby, 2002). The way how physical geography is defined requires at the outset a discursive effort. The impact of geography on politics cannot be solely studied in a positivist fashion because statesmen and people who are interested in geopolitics tend to interpret the impact of physical characteristics of geography on politics through their subjective understandings. This suggests that geopolitics as an academic field can best be analyzed through the techniques of critical epistemology and methodology. The meaning of geopolitics at times when geographical location and physical terrain were too important in the quest of states to maximize their political and economic power was quite different than the meaning of geopolitics at times when technological developments in

Since the second half of the nineteenth century till the onset of the Cold War era, geopolitics was mainly an imperial exercise undertaken by great powers. Mackinder, a geographer in the United Kingdom, is considered to be the first important geopolitical thinker.

Mackinder, a geographer in the United Kingdom, is considered to be the first important geopolitical thinker. His heartland theory assumes that the particular power that controls the Eurasian landmass would eventually control the global politics and master the universe. In his characterization, land powers are more likely to lay claim to regional and global hegemony than maritime powers. From this perspective all great powers of the time were in a geopolitical competition to ensure that their rivals do not possess full control of the Eurasian landmass. His thoughts seem to have had great impact on Anglo-Saxon geopolitical tradition in that both the British empire during the age of Pax-Britanica and the United States during the age of Pax-Americana spent a good deal of effort to prevent any particular European or Asian country from dominating the Eurasian heartland.
Unlike Mackinder, Alfred Mahan, a military historian in the United States, argued that the road to global primacy in international politics would go through mastering oceans and other sea lines. He recommended that the leaders of the United States follow in the footsteps of the British Empire to build up a massive naval force if they want to become the most powerful country on earth. Controlling international trade routes at sea would require huge investments in bluewater navy as well as the United States establishing military bases in vital choke points. In Mahan’s thinking, controlling sea traffic through a powerful navy would absolve the United States of taking direct control of other countries. To him, the United States should avoid transforming other nations in the image of American values and stay away from nation-building exercises in far distant places. The United States is already safe because of its territorial location.

Both the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Imitative and the so-called Quad Initiative aim at bringing into existence a counter-Chinese power block by pushing the traditional American allies in the region to gear up their military expenditures and improve security cooperation among them. Quad members are the United States, Japan, India and Australia. The United States strongly disputes China’s sovereignty claims in the East and South China Seas and it has noticeably increased the frequency of its naval operations there.

For example, the containment policy that was initially put into existence by the US-led western camp in order to prevent the Soviet Union from physically dominating particular geographical locations reflected ideational motivations in the background. At stake was not only containing the physicalSoviet penetration into some geographical locations but also ensuring that Soviet ideology did not enlarge to those locations.

New world order geopolitics suggested that there was only one super power all over the world and all other states would gain influence in international politics in relation to the status of their relationship with the global hegemon. That sole superpower happened to be the United States. There was a huge power gap between the United States and all other countries and it was nearly impossible for any country, acting alone or in cooperation with others, to counterbalance the American hegemony. Hence, bandwagoning appears to have replaced balancing in the age American primacy in global politics.

Third generation geopolitics began with the end of the Cold War rivalry between two opposing power blocks adopting diverging political ideologies. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the unification of Germany in 1990 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 epitomized the end of ideological geopolitics. (Page 32)
FOURTH GENERATION OF GEOPOLITICS
Even though the 9/11 attacks on the US homeland dented the image of the United States as the omnipotent global hegemon and criticisms of the American approach to the global war on terror intensified following the US occupation of Iraq, it was primarily following the financial crisis of the late 2000s that a sense of decline began to percolate down to the western elites in the United States and EU members.

The liberal world order, which has come into being following the end of World War II under American leadership, has been going through a radical transformation in recent years mostly owing to China’s spectacular rise. In parallel to its increasing material power capability, China is also posing fundamental challenges to the normative fabric of the liberal world order.

Persuasive soft powers are those that think they need to invest some capital in order to help create legitimacy and attraction in the eyes of others. They develop specific strategies not only to brandish their achievements but also persuade others that their behaviors and policies are legitimate and other-regarding. In this regard, persuasive soft powers take great pains in helping manufacture attraction in the eyes of targeted countries through the employment of diplomatic means of conflict resolution, public diplomacy efforts, development aids and multilateral and facilitative diplomacy at interstate and intrastate disputes.

Page 26.
Unlike Mackinder, Alfred Mahan, a military historian in the United States, argued that the road to global primacy in international politics would go through mastering oceans and other sea lines. He recommended that the leaders of the United States follow in the footsteps of the British Empire to build up a massive naval force if they want to become the most powerful country on earth. Controlling international trade routes at sea would require huge investments in bluewater navy as well as the United States establishing military bases in vital choke points. In Mahan’s thinking, controlling sea traffic through a powerful navy would absolve the United States of taking direct control of other countries. Therefore, the correct option is B.

Page 27.
Geopolitics in its early stages was closely associated with Germany’s foreign policy practices, a latecomer in the struggle for building colonial empires across the globe. Friedrich Ratzel and Karl Haushofer are the most notable German geopolitical thinkers and their thoughts on geopolitics profoundly shaped foreign policies of Nazi Germany during the interwar years and Second World War. The impact of their thought on Nazi Germany’s policies was so decisive and pernicious that geopolitics had been for a long time associated with Hitler’s Germany and considered to be an intellectual exercise serving Hitler’s goals to institute German hegemony across the globe. Rather than geopolitics being recognized as a respectable field of academic study, even the word of geopolitics was avoided in writings on international relations. Hitler’s policies gave a bad reputation to geopolitics. It took some time to recognize geopolitics as a distinct academic discipline. Therefore, the correct option is A.

Page 27.
The idea that countries’ geographical location is their destiny is very much informed by such imperial/first-age geopolitical thinking. Geography serves either as a power multiplier or constraint on maneuvering capability. First generation geopolitical thinkers were quite influential in the dissemination of the idea that geography is destiny. Therefore, the correct option is B.

Page 29.
The idea that geography is destiny manifests itself in security culture and practices of other countries as well. For example while the United States is mainly a sea power trying to project power across the world through its blue water navy and marine forces, Russia, China and Germany are textbook examples of land powers. Land powers tend to invest a lot in their armies and defensive military capabilities mainly because they feel themselves surrounded by numerous neighboring countries. Therefore, the correct option is D.

Page 30.
The second generation of geopolitical studies came to the fore following the end of the Second World War. Throughout the long Cold war years, the US-led Western camp was in bitter ideological competition with the Soviet Union-led eastern camp. Therefore, the correct option is B.

Page 31.
The second generation of geopolitical studies came to the fore following the end of the Second World War. Throughout the long Cold war years, the US-led Western camp was in bitter ideological competition with the Soviet Union-led eastern camp. The major faultiness between the two opposing power blocks was ideological. The parties competed with each other as to whose politicaleconomic model would triumph across the globe. Ideology and identity were the main signifiers of their geopolitical competition. This era in geopolitical studies is also called ideological geopolitics. Therefore, the correct option is E.

Page 32.
Third generation geopolitics began with the end of the Cold War rivalry between two opposing power blocks adopting diverging political ideologies. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the unification of Germany in 1990 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 epitomized the end of ideological geopolitics. Since the early 1990s till the end of the first decade of the twenty first century, analysts observed the rise of a new geopolitical understanding being defined by many as a new world order. Therefore, the correct option is A.

Page 32.
Third generation geopolitics began with the end of the Cold War rivalry between two opposing power blocks adopting diverging political ideologies. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the unification of Germany in 1990 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 epitomized the end of ideological geopolitics. Since the early 1990s till the end of the first decade of the twenty first century, analysts observed the rise of a new geopolitical understanding being defined by many as a new world order. New world order geopolitics suggested that there was only one super power all over the world and all other states would gain influence in international politics in relation to the status of their relationship with the global hegemon. That sole superpower happened to be the United States. Therefore, the correct option is C.

Page 35.
China’s gains from the liberal-capitalist global order have mainly emanated from western sponsorship, rather than from China acting as a convicted disciple. So long as the western powers, particularly the United States, assumed that China would turn out to become a responsible stakeholder and gradually transform into a liberal democratic polity, they tolerated China’s rise and its inappropriate trade practices and non-democratic political values. The West was able to endure some economic losses relative to emerging powers, so long as it had self-confidence. The western powers have not been immune to such currents either. The last decade has witnessed the rise of populist and illiberal political movements in key western countries. The internal criticism of liberal democratic practices has severely affected the attractiveness of a liberal world order. As the Brexit decision in the United Kingdom and the election of Donald Trump to presidency in the United States demonstrate, the forces of illiberalism, populism, protectionism, and xenophobia have gained ground in key western countries. Therefore, the correct option is E.

Page 36.
The fundamental claim of critical geopolitical studies is that all kinds of geopolitical understandings are subjective and reflect particular values and previously conceived national interests. There is not an objective scientific understanding of geopolitics as claimed by first generation geopolitical writers. Naming particular physical locations as they are and attributing meanings to geographical locations are all political exercises in the background. There is not a bird-view of geopolitics which is claimed to be timeless and ahistorical. Therefore, the correct option is A.

In the first stage of geopolitical thinking, geopolitics was understood as an objective scientific exercise whose primary reason was to offer ironclad statements on the impact of geographical location and physical terrain on the ability of states to maximize their power in international politics.

All of the items are correct.

By periodically increasing the price of oil and gas and by pushing further for the construction of alternative pipelines tying Russia to individual European countries, such as the Nord Stream II pipeline, Russia has been forcing the countries lying in its neighborhood to toe its line in foreign policy.

The kind of rivalry between the Soviet Union and Peoples’ Republic of China during the Cold War era also evinces strong doses of ideological geopolitics.
Turkey asked western security protection against the Soviet Union in the second half of the 1940.

Third generation geopolitics began with the end of the Cold War rivalry between two opposing power blocks adopting diverging political ideologies. The fall of the Berlin Wall
in 1989, the unification of Germany in 1990 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 epitomized the end of ideological geopolitics.

The wars in the Balkans and the Caucasus during the 1990s demonstrated that the major threats to regional and global security would stem from internal conflicts rather than interstate power competitions. During this time period many states across the globe, saving the United States, decreased their military spending in proportion to their Cold War era spending and armies went through a transformation process thereby their peacekeeping and peacemaking capabilities improved.

China’s gains from the liberalcapitalist global order have mainly emanated from western sponsorship, rather than from China acting as a convicted disciple. So long as the western powers, particularly the United States, assumed that China would turn out to become a responsible stakeholder and gradually transform into a liberal democratic polity, they tolerated China’s rise and its inappropriate trade practices and non democratic political values. The West was able to endure some economic losses relative to emerging powers, so long as it had self-confidence.

In today’s international order, the ideological polarization of opposing power blocks is not as sharp and rigid as it was during the Cold War era.

The correct answer is "national."

Chinese leaders also avoid taking global responsibilities. This is a challenge mainly because the costs of maintaining global stability and providing global commons will dramatically increase absent the Chinese contribution. On the other hand such a reluctant approach to global governance might suggest that China is not resolved to replace the United States as the global hegemon.

Since the second half of the nineteenth century till the onset of the Cold War era, geopolitics was mainly an imperial exercise undertaken by great powers. Mackinder, a geographer in the United Kingdom, is considered to be the first important geopolitical thinker. Doğru cevap " A " dır.

Similarly Turkey feels itself exposed to myriad security challenges emanating from the wider Middle East due to its proximity to the region. Turkey also tries to leverage its transit country role in its relations with the European Union. One of the core arguments of those who think the European Union would do well to admit Turkey to membership is that Turkey would help lessen EU’s excessive reliance on Russian gas and oil resources. Turkey would simply connect the energy thirsty European Union members to energy abundant countries in the Caucasus, Central Asia and Middle East. Doğru cevap " B " dir.

The United States is surrounded by two vast oceans to the west and east and it has relatively twoweak neighbors to the north and south. It is not located in close proximity to many conflict-riven places in the world and developments
in far distant places tend to have minor impact on core American security and economic interests. doğru cevap " C " dir.

When Turkey asked western security protection against the Soviet Union in the
second half of the 1940, the American statesmen approached Turkey from an ideological perspective and legitimized the issue of Turkey’s membership in NATO mainly on the basis of identity related concerns. It was for sure that Turkey’s contribution to NATO alliance would emanate from its geographical location and military power capability and Turkey would play a key role in containing the Soviet penetration into the wider Middle East. Doğru cevap " D " dir.

Since the early 1990s until 2008, the United States, in partnership with its European allies within NATO and the European Union, dictated international politics. This period was the heyday of the ‘liberal international order’. Not only did it gradually expand to include former communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, but also the immense material power capabilities of the United States allowed her to pursue primacist strategies all around the world. Doğru cevap " E " dir.

The extreme self-confidence on the part of the American statesmen led them to argue that the United States is the indispensable nation and there is no need to help bring into existence new regional or global security organizations that would potentially replace NATO. It was in accordance with such thinking that whenever the Russian leadership offered the idea that a new panEuropean security organization should be founded replacing western-dominated ones, the Americans simply ignored them. Doğru cevap " A " dır.

The western powers have not been immune to such currents either. The last decade has witnessed the rise of populist and illiberal political movements in key western countries. The internal criticism of liberal democratic practices has severely affected the attractiveness of a liberal world order. Doğru cevap " B " dir.

The liberal world order, which has come into being following the end of World War II under American leadership, has been going through a radical transformation in recent years mostly owing to China’s spectacular rise. In parallel to its increasing material power capability, China is also posing fundamental challenges to the normative fabric of the liberal world order. Doğru cevap " C " dir.

China is not openly questioning the established western liberal order by either forming antiwestern coalitions of states or doing its best to make sure that western-led international organizations do not operate smoothly. It is for sure that China, along with many other rising powers, wants to see that its growing ascendance in global politics be accommodated institutionally and peacefully. However, should western powers decline to accommodate China, the latter will not hesitate to help establish alternative institutional platforms under its guidance, such as the Asia Infrastructure and Investment Bank and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. China values external democratization of global politics rather than internal democratization of national politics. Doğru cevap " D " dir.

Tangible sources are those that can be quantified, measured, observed and categorized. Such sources are military capability, economic might, geographical location, population number, human development, technological prowess, environmental factors, and etc. Doğru cevap " E " dir.

Geopolitics tries to examine the relationship between geography and politics and ascertains the impact of geographical location and characteristics of states on the interplay of international political competition among them. Throughout history there have occurred different understandings of geopolitics and it is not easy to agree on a common definition of geopolitical thought in the literature (O Tauthail, Dalby, Routledge, 2003). Geopolitics as a unique academic discipline has also close links to International Relations, Security Studies and Strategic Studies. All these academic disciplines share the view that international politics is first and foremost a struggle for power among sovereign nation states. Another close relationship exists between geopolitics and geo-economics. Differentiating between the use of geography for political goals and economic goals is not an easy exercise to do because political and economic motivations of states are very much intermingled with each other. The best example to offer in this regard is China’s One-Road-One-Belt Initiative. The goals of power and wealth maximizations closely relate to each other and most of the time the road to further political power goes through economic power.
What lies at the roots of geopolitical thinking is the never-ending process of attributing an overarching meaning to physical geography (O Tauthail and Dalby, 2002). The way how physical geography is defined requires at the outset a discursive effort. The impact of geography on politics cannot be solely studied in a positivist fashion because statesmen and people who are interested in geopolitics tend to interpret the impact of physical characteristics of geography on politics through their subjective understandings. This suggests that geopolitics as an academic field can best be analyzed through the techniques of critical epistemology and methodology. The meaning of geopolitics at times when geographical location and physical terrain were too important in the quest of states to maximize their political and economic power was quite different than the meaning of geopolitics at times when technological developments inthe realms of military industry, communication, transportation and information have gradually rendered the mere physical location meaningless in international politics. Since the second half of the nineteenth century till now, the meaning of geopolitics, particularly in regards to what kind of a relationship exists between geography and politics, has varied tremendously.
As also understood from the information given, the answer is E. All of the statements in the options related to geopolitics are correct.

Since the second half of the nineteenth century till the onset of the Cold War era, geopolitics was mainly an imperial exercise undertaken by great powers. Mackinder, a geographer in the United Kingdom, is considered to be the first important geopolitical thinker. His heartland theory assumes that the particular power that controls the Eurasian landmass would eventually control the global politics and master the universe. In his characterization, land powers are more likely to lay claim to regional and global hegemony than maritime powers. From this perspective all great powers of the time were in a geopolitical competition to ensure that their rivals do not possess full control of the Eurasian landmass. His thoughts seem to have had great impact on Anglo-Saxon geopolitical tradition in that both the British empire during the age of Pax-Britanica and the United States during the age of Pax-Americana spent a good deal of effort to prevent any particular European or Asian country from dominating the Eurasian heartland.
As also understood from the information given, the answer is E. All of the statements in the options related to geopolitics in early stages.

Unlike Mackinder, Alfred Mahan, a military historian in the United States, argued that the road to global primacy in international politics would go through mastering oceans and other sea lines. He recommended that the leaders of the United States follow in the footsteps of the British Empire to build up a massive naval force if they want to become the most powerful country on earth. Controlling international trade routes at sea would require huge investments in bluewater navy as well as the United States establishing military bases in vital choke points. In Mahan’s thinking, controlling sea traffic through a powerful navy would absolve the United States of taking direct control of other countries. To him, the United States should avoid transforming other nations in the image of American values and stay away from nation-building exercises in far distant places. The United States is already safe because of its territorial location. The two oceans to its east and west and two weak neighbors to its north and south provide Americans with a high degree of security compared to the nationals of many other countries. Therefore, the American decision makers would do well to invest in navy rather than army. Mahan was of the view that Hamiltonianism would serve American global interests better than other strategies. The best the US should do was to become a role model for others and engage in international trade. If push comes to shove the powerful American navy would protect the American populace and American trade interests across the globe.
As also understood from the information given, the answer is E. All of the statements in the options related to Alfred Mahan are correct.

Geopolitics in its early stages was closely associated with Germany’s foreign policy practices, a latecomer in the struggle for building colonial empires across the globe (Dodds, 2007). Friedrich Ratzel and Karl Haushofer are the most notable German geopolitical thinkers and their thoughts on geopolitics profoundly shaped foreign policies of Nazi Germany during the interwar years and Second World War. The impact of their thought on Nazi Germany’s policies was so decisive and pernicious that geopolitics had been for a long time associated with Hitler’s Germany and considered to be an intellectual exercise serving Hitler’s goals to institute German hegemony across the globe. Rather than geopolitics being recognized as a respectable field of academic study, even the word of geopolitics was avoided in writings on international relations. Hitler’s policies gave a bad reputation to geopolitics. It took some time to recognize geopolitics as a distinct academic discipline.
To Ratzel and Houshofer, states are like living organisms that require lebensraum, viz. living spaces, to survive in the anarchical international environment. Just as individuals require a healthy body and mental condition, states are also in need of fertile and defensible physical terrain as well as robust and uncontaminated people to survive in international politics. Darwin’s survival of the fittest characterization of interpersonal relations would apply to interstate relations quite well. Hitler carried such thoughts one step further in arguing that the German/Arian race is superior to all other races and its purity needs to be ensured through the elimination of Jews, transsexuals and gypsies from the German nation. Hitler’s geopolitical thinking was also informed by the idea that all ethnic Germans should be brought together under the rule of German state. Such thinking on the part of Hitler’s Nazi government pushed Germany to invade neighboring countries one by one and then organize a massive attack against the Soviet Union during the Second World War. The concentration camps constructed by Nazi Germany across Europe were used to undertake a massive genocide against Jews.
As also understood from the information given, the answer is E. All of the statements in the options related to geopolitics in early stages are correct.

The second generation of geopolitical studies came to the fore following the end of the Second World War. Throughout the long Cold war years, the US-led Western camp was in bitter ideological competition with the Soviet Union-led eastern camp. The major faultiness between the two opposing power blocks was ideological. The parties competed with each other as to whose political-economic model would triumph across the globe. Ideology and identity were the main signifiers of their geopolitical competition. This era in geopolitical studies is also called ideological geopolitics (Gray and Sloan, 2013).
As also understood from the information given, the answer is E. All of the statements in the options related to second generation of geopolitical studies are correct.

There was a rivalry between the two camps over the so-called Third World. At stake was to ensure the countries that were considered to be part of the Third World should not join the opposing side. Third world countries also constituted the playing ground between the two camps. Rather than facing off each other directly, they both preferred to score goals against each other through their proxies in the Third World countries. In many of the internal power struggles in Third World countries the United States and the Soviet Union supported different fractions. Critical decisions on offering military aid, assisting economic development and providing territorial security were usually taken with ideological considerations in the background.
The second generation of geopolitical studies came to the fore following the end of the Second World War. Throughout the long Cold war years, the US-led Western camp was in bitter ideological competition with the Soviet Union-led eastern camp. The major faultiness between the two opposing power blocks was ideological. The parties competed with each other as to whose political-economic model would triumph across the globe. Ideology and identity were the main signifiers of their geopolitical competition. This era in geopolitical studies is also called ideological geopolitics
The camps in this competition in the ideological geopolitics era were the liberal-democratic capitalist western countries and authoritarian communist eastern countries. In the middle were the so-called Third World countries. The way how each camp approached the issues of armament, development, industrialization, human rights and security was profoundly influenced by their ideological positions. For example, the containment policy that was initially put into existence by the US-led western camp in order to prevent the Soviet Union from physically dominating particular geographical locations reflected ideational motivations in the background. At stake was not only containing the physicalSoviet penetration into some geographical locations but also ensuring that Soviet ideology did not enlarge to those locations. Geographical regions were attributed identity related ideological meanings. To be a part of the west meant not only having military cooperation with the United States multilaterally or bilaterally but also subscribing to the constitutive norms of the western international society. Ideological lenses dominated how statesmen in both camps approached geopolitics. There was a rivalry between the two camps over the so-called Third World. At stake was to ensure the countries that were considered to be part of the Third World should not join the opposing side. Third world countries also constituted the playing ground between the two camps. Rather than facing off each other directly, they both preferred to score goals against each other through their proxies in the Third World countries. In many of the internal power struggles in Third World countries the United States and the Soviet Union supported different fractions. Critical decisions on offering military aid, assisting economic development and providing territorial security were usually taken with ideological considerations in the background.
As also understood from the information given, the answer is E. All of the statements in the options related to ideological geopolitcs are correct.

During the Cold War era, both the United States and the Soviet Union did their best to increase the number of countries adopting their political ideologies. Their goal was to help enlarge their ideological sphere of influence. A more recent example of ideological geopolitics has taken place over the last decade when the illiberal authoritarian model of China and Russia appears to have dented the image of liberal democracy in the West. Even though the emerging geopolitical rivalry between today’s United States and China can in no way be compared to the ideological rivalry between the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War era, it would not be wrong to argue that the emerging geopolitical competition between Beijing and Washington does also demonstrate diverging normative understandings of political and economic values. A growing number of analysts and observers point out that the United States would do well to help bring into existence a league of liberal democracies if she wanted to contain the rise of China in global politics. It is not a coincidence that all the major powers in Asia that feel themselves threatened by China’s rise are democracies. The members of Quad are all democracies in different shades.
From a similar perspective, China and Russia have been supporting particular political parties and movements across the world that all appear to hold extremely critical views on multiculturalism, immigration, multilateralism and liberal democracy. Today’s Russia and China appear to excel in authoritarianism and state-led capitalism. Even though Trump’s America is fast moving in the direction of illiberal democracy, it would not be wrong to argue that the escalating geopolitical competition between the United States on the one hand and China and Russia on the other demonstrates strong ideological characteristics. After all what is at stake in this emerging rivalry is whether the liberal-democratic capitalist model will defeat the illiberal authoritarian model in the quest for economic development and political maturation.
As also understood from the information given, the answer is E. All of the statements in the options related to geopolitics during the Cold War era are correct.

Third generation geopolitics began with the end of the Cold War rivalry between two opposing power blocks adopting diverging political ideologies. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the unification of Germany in 1990 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 epitomized the end of ideological geopolitics. Since the early 1990s till the end of the first decade of the twenty first century, analysts observed the rise of a new geopolitical understanding being defined by many as a new world order. New world order geopolitics suggested that there was only one super power all over the world and all other states would gain influence in international politics in relation to the status of their relationship with the global hegemon. That sole superpower happened to be the United States. There was a huge power gap between the United States and all other countries and it was nearly impossible for any country, acting alone or in cooperation with others, to counterbalance the American hegemony. Hence, bandwagoning appears to have replaced balancing in the age American primacy in global politics.
As also understood from the informaation given, the answer is E. All of the statements in the options related to third generation geopoltics are correct.

The extreme self-confidence on the part of the American statesmen led them to argue that the United States is the indispensable nation and there is no need to help bring into existence new regional or global security organizations that would potentially replace NATO. It was in accordance with such thinking that whenever the Russian leadership offered the idea that a new pan-European security organization should be founded replacing western-dominated ones, the Americans simply ignored them.
A cardinal characteristic of the third generation geopolitics was that the possibility of any great power war would be almost zero because it was assumed that all great powers would pay an utmost care to get along with the United States well. Just because none of the great powers was in a position to challenge the American preeminence and lay claim to hegemony in its own region, the best thing to do on their side would be bandwagoning with the sole superpower.
Looking from this perspective, armed conflicts would rather take place within states. Intrastate wars, viz. civil wars, would replace interstate wars. The wars in the Balkans and the Caucasus during the 1990s demonstrated that the major threats to regional and global security would stem from internal conflicts rather than interstate power competitions. During this time period many states across the globe, saving the United States, decreased their military spending in proportion to their Cold War era spending and armies went through a transformation process thereby their peacekeeping and peacemaking capabilities improved.
This time period also attested to the heyday of the European Union integration process. The EU both enlarged horizontally and deepened vertically. Many countries around the globe looked to the European Union integration process as the ideal example to emulate. EU appeared to be a successful role model for other countries across the globe. New world order geopolitics suggested that American hegemony would keep the peace in the world and other countries would be able to devote much more energy and capital to their economic development and political maturation in line with liberal democratic capitalist values.
As also understood from the information given, the answer is E. All of the statements above related to third generation of geopolitics are correct.

Fourth Generation of Geopolitcs
Even though the 9/11 attacks on the US homeland dented the image of the United States as the omnipotent global hegemon and criticisms of the American approach to the global war on terror intensified following the US occupation of Iraq, it was primarily following the financial crisis of the late 2000s that a sense of decline began to percolate down to the western elites in the United States and EU members.
After the 9/11 Attacks
Not only has the feeling of optimism eroded but also the specter of non-western powers challenging the primacy of western powers has begun to haunt many westerners. As the Russian resurgence and Chinese revival took root, the calls for accommodating rising non-western powers in the institutional structure of the liberal international order began to be heard more loudly (Guzzini, 2012). The revised security strategy of the European Union (issued in the summer of the 2016), and the first national security strategy of the Trump administration (issued in December 2017) demonstrate that western powers feel threatened by the rise of non-western powers. Both documents suggest some ways to deal with the resurgence of traditional security concerns as well as the worldwide emergence of illiberal authoritarianism. Since 2008 there have been disputes all over the world over the values of multiculturalism, openness, tolerance, and universal human rights. The morality of universal cosmopolitanism has gradually given way to the morality of relative communitarianism as rising non-western powers, primarily China and Russia, have increasingly offered non-western conceptualizations of international political order. Non-interference in states’ internal affairs, primacy of state sovereignty, authoritarian leadership, the strengthening of national identities, state-led capitalism, spheres of influence mentality, multi-polarism in global governance, primacy of great powers in international relations, mercantilist trade practices, investment in military power capabilities, an increased use of economic power instruments in the name of securing geopolitical gains, and the questioning of the principle ‘responsibility to protect’ are some of the points that Russian and Chinese leaderships have been vehemently prioritizing over the last decade. This does not, however, suggest that countries like China have not benefited from the liberal international order, particularly in the field of economics. Yet, China’s gains from the liberal-capitalist global order have mainly emanated from western sponsorship, rather than from China acting as a convicted disciple. So long as the western powers, particularly the United States, assumed that China would turn out to become a responsible stakeholder and gradually transform into a liberal democratic polity, they tolerated China’s rise and its inappropriate trade practices and non-democratic political values. The West was able to endure some economic losses relative to emerging powers, so long as it had self-confidence. The western powers have not been immune to such currents either. The last decade has witnessed the rise of populist and illiberal political movements in key western countries. The internal criticism of liberal democratic practices has severely affected the attractiveness of a liberal world order. As the Brexit decision in the United Kingdom and the election of Donald Trump to presidency in the United States demonstrate, the forces of illiberalism, populism, protectionism, and xenophobia have gained ground in key western countries. Parallel to the shift in material power capabilities across the globe and the growing challenges posed to the normative foundation of the liberal international order, realpolitik foreign policy practices and pragmatic concerns in defining national interests have become more pronounced than moralpolitik practices and normative concerns (Nye, 2015). Power politics and ‘sphere of influence’ mentality have experienced a revival over the last decade. As geo-economic and geopolitical motivations have become more decisive in states’ foreign policies, the dynamics of alliance relationships have also gone through a radical transformation. During the last decade, long-term identity based alliance relationships have been replaced with short-term, pragmatic, and issueoriented strategic partnerships. The practice of forming interest-oriented cooperation initiatives within multilateral and bilateral frameworks has gained ground in recent years. In today’s world, countries of different value orientations, geographical locations, power capabilities, and threat perceptions are no longer bound to define each other categorically as enemies or friends. The notion of ‘frenemy’ has already become an identity signifier in interstate relations. The practice of coalitions defining missions has gradually given way to the practice of missions defining coalitions. As opposed to Cold War bipolarity and the unipolar order during the first two decades of the post-Cold War era, the practice of illiberal authoritarian states engaging in pragmatic outcome-oriented cooperation with liberal-minded states is now conceivable.
As also understood from the information given, the answer is E. All of the statements in the options related to fourth generation of geopolitics are correct.

In today’s international order, the ideological polarization of opposing power blocks is not as sharp and rigid as it was during the Cold War era. The interconnectedness between liberal western powers and illiberal authoritarian powers is much higher now than it was between western capitalist and eastern communist countries during the Cold war era. This suggests that we now live in a multiplex world order. Not only are there more actors in international relations but also issues have become so complex that dealing with them increasingly requires global perspectives. This world order leads states with various power capabilities to adopt multidimensional and multidirectional foreign policy strategies.
Even though the debate on the decline of the West still lingers and many question the idea of declinizm in the United States, it is now clear that the United States under Trump’s presidency no longer wants to play the leader of the liberal international order. This creates enough room for non-western rising powers to act more assertively and become more visible across the globe.
As also understood from the information given, the answer is E. All of the statements in the options related to fourth generation geopolitics are correct.

Critical Geopolitics
The word ‘geopolitics’ consists of two different words. ‘Geo’ is the abbreviation of geography. Politics means deciding who gets what, how and when. Geography consists of two words, geo and graphy. Geo means earth and graphy means writing. Geopolitics means the politics of writing the earth. The fundamental claim of critical geopolitical studies is that all kinds of geopolitical understandings are subjective and reflect particular values and previously conceived national interests. There is not an objective scientific understanding of geopolitics as claimed by first generation geopolitical writers. Naming particular physical locations as they are and attributing meanings to geographical locations are all political exercises in the background. There is not a bird-view of geopolitics which is claimed to be timeless and ahistorical.
Geopolitics and Power Relations
From the perspective of critical geopolitics, meanings attributed to particular geographical locations emanate from deeply held political interests and subjective understandings of identity (O Tuathail, 1996). Power relations determine purchasing value of geopolitical understandings. Throughout history different meanings have been attributed to geographical sites. The question to be asked, from the perspective of critical geopolitics, should be which political interests are cloaked under particular geopolitical conceptualizations at different times. Identifying a physical place on earth with particular national interests, identities, ideologies or civilizations is in fact a political exercise. The question of whose geopolitical imagination will prevail in the final analysis will be profoundly determined by the distribution of power capabilities within the international system. All claims to objective geopolitical analyses in fact mask particular political motivations and interests (Ingram and Dodds, 2009). To give an example, one can underline the fact that many people in the world today call the place Middle East as Middle East without thinking any moment why this region is called Middle East. Which actors first depicted this region as such and for which particular purposes? Critical geopolitics as a subfield of geopolitics tries to uncover hidden political purposes and motivations lying behind allegedly objective and neutral geopolitical observations. From the perspective of critical geopolitics, there are no objective geopolitical claims. All such claims are for someone and for some purposes.
As also understood from the information given, the answer is E. All of the statements in the options related to critical geopolitics are correct.

The word ‘geopolitics’ consists of two different words. ‘Geo’ is the abbreviation of geography. Politics means deciding who gets what, how and when. Geography consists of two words, geo and graphy. Geo means earth and graphy means writing. Geopolitics means the politics of writing the earth.
As also understood from the information given, the answer is E. All of the statements in the options related to the meaning of geopolitics are correct.
The fundamental claim of critical geopolitical studies is that all kinds of geopolitical understandings are subjective and reflect particular values and previously conceived national interests. There is not an objective scientific understanding of geopolitics as claimed by first generation geopolitical writers. Naming particular physical locations as they are and attributing meanings to geographical locations are all political exercises in the background. There is not a bird-view of geopolitics which is claimed to be timeless and ahistorical.

Geopolitical understandings of different time periods tend to demonstrate diverging conceptualizations of power. Power is closely related to geopolitics. For example, while first and fourth generation of geopolitical competitions underline the primacy of hard power calculations and behaviors in relational relations, second and third generation of geopolitics tend to put more emphasis on soft power. Critical geopolitics would on the other hand say that it is not easy to separate hard power from soft power and states employ a mix of all power capabilities and relations in their efforts to justify their geopolitical view and claims. That said, a brief discussion on the concept of power would be meaningful in this context.
The concept of power is one of the most popular and elusive concepts in the academic discipline of International Relations (Nye, 2011). To many, power is the ability of one actor to influence the behavior, interests and identity of other actors in the image of its own priorities, preferences and values. Put differently, power is the ability of one actor to get what it wants from others. The crux of the issue here is to define from where this ability comes and whether one can measure it. This suggests that power has both residual and relational aspects. Power is residual because being powerful requires a particular state to possess both some capabilities, of both tangible and intangible sorts, and the will to use them in order to have an impact on others. Without those capabilities at the first instance and the will in the background, it is nearly impossible to influence others. Tangible sources are those that can be quantified, measured, observed and categorized. Such sources are military capability, economic might, geographical location, population number, human development, technological prowess, environmental factors, and etc. Intangible sources of power are those that cannot be easily observed, tested or measured. Values, norms, societal cohesion, culture, image and identity are typical examples of intangible power capabilities.
Power is also relational because for power to exist there needs to be at least two actors interacting with each other. For example, if the state B does not meet the demands of the state A or change its behaviors along the expectations of the State A, the state A does not have power over the state B. Possessing mere power capabilities and the will to use them does not automatically translate into being powerful. Being powerful requires the compliance of others with the demands of the state that tries to have an impact on their choices.
As also understood from the information given, the answer is E. All of the statements in the options related to power and geopolitics are correct.

Not all states are willing to have an influence on the choices of others. Some states are defined as status-quo oriented powers whereas some others are considered to be as status-seekers or status-quo changers. Status-quo oriented states are those that are content with the current power configuration in the system and they do not aspire to change it. They are merely concerned with their existing status within the system and want to make sure that it continues. Their foreign policies most of the time begin and end at their national borders. They are generally risk-averse states. Rather than act, they react to external developments. They are not concerned with how other states are ruled internally and act externally. In their imaginations the number one foreign policy interest/priority is to make sure that external developments do not affect their internal order and current position within the system negatively. Even though many of such states can be found at fringes of international politics, it is extremely difficult to put a particular state into this category because even the status-quo oriented states have to play by the rules of power politics and engage others instrumentally to protect what they possess at a given time.
As also understood from the information given, the answer is E. All of the statements in the options related to status-quo oriented states are correct.

Not all states are willing to have an influence on the choices of others. Some states are defined as status-quo oriented powers whereas some others are considered to be as status-seekers or status-quo changers. Status-quo oriented states are those that are content with the current power configuration in the system and they do not aspire to change it. They are merely concerned with their existing status within the system and want to make sure that it continues. Their foreign policies most of the time begin and end at their national borders. They are generally risk-averse states. Rather than act, they react to external developments. They are not concerned with how other states are ruled internally and act externally. In their imaginations the number one foreign policy interest/priority is to make sure that external developments do not affect their internal order and current position within the system negatively. Even though many of such states can be found at fringes of international politics, it is extremely difficult to put a particular state into this category because even the status-quo oriented states have to play by the rules of power politics and engage others instrumentally to protect what they possess at a given time.
On the other hand, some states have a much broader definition of national interests. Such states tend to have aspirations transcending their national orders. They are risk-takers in that they try to help bring into existence a new power configuration within the existing system so that they find themselves in a much better and prestigious position than before. Whereas some status-quo changer states are only concerned with having an impact on foreign policy behaviors of other states, some others would be very much preoccupied with the projection and promotion of their values and norms onto others. The status-quo changer states prioritizing foreign policy behaviors of others would primarily focus on increasing their material power capabilities vis-a-vis others. At stake for them is the material distribution of power capabilities within the system at a given time. The status-quo changer states trying to project their values and norms onto others would on the other hand be profoundly concerned with the normative foundations of the system. They would hold that their power over others would positively vary with their ability to help transform them in the image of their values and norms. In this sense, status-quo changer states of this kind are all normative powers in that they try to achieve their goals by projecting and expanding their norms onto others.
As also understood from the information given, the answer is E. All of the statements in the options related to status-quo changer states are correct. All great powers, such as the United States, China, Russia and the European Union, are normative powers. The countries that wish to have regional spheres of influence are also within this camp. For example, following its ascendance to the top position of international power hierarchy, the United States has put the transformation of international politics in line with American values and standards at the center of its foreign policy. Similarly, the ongoing discussions on rising powers make it explicitly clear that those states are status-quo changer states because they put a strong challenge to the privileged position of western actors within the existing global order, both materially and normatively.

Geopolitics as a unique academic discipline has also close links to International Relations, Security Studies, and Strategic Studies. The correct answer is C

Mackinder, a geographer in the United Kingdom, is considered to be the first important geopolitical thinker. The correct answer is B

The second generation of geopolitical studies came to the fore following the end of the Second World War. The correct answer is A.

Third generation geopolitics began with the end of the Cold War rivalry between two opposing power blocks adopting diverging political ideologies. The correct answer is C

Ideology and identity were the main signifiers of second era's geopolitical soul. The correct answer is E.

Since the early 1990s until 2008, the United States, in partnership with its European allies within NATO and the European Union, dictated international politics. This period was the heyday of the liberal international order. The correct answer is C.

The 9/11 attacks on the US homeland dented the image of the United States as the omnipotent global hegemon and criticisms of the American approach to the global war on terror intensified following the US occupation of Iraq. The correct answer is D

The fundamental claim of critical geopolitical studies is that all kinds of geopolitical understandings are subjective and reflect particular values and
previously conceived national interests. The correct answer is B

The correct answer is A

Geopolitics as a unique academic discipline has also close links to International Relations, Security Studies and Strategic Studies. All these academic disciplines share the view that international politics is first and foremost a struggle for power among sovereign nation states.

Mackinder, a geographer in the United Kingdom, is considered to be the first important geopolitical thinker. His heartland theory assumes that the particular power that controls the Eurasian landmass would eventually control the global politics and master the universe. In his characterization, land powers are more likely to lay claim to regional and global hegemony than maritime powers.

The idea that countries’ geographical location is their destiny is very much informed by such imperial/first-age geopolitical thinking. Geography serves either as a power multiplier or constraint on maneuvering capability. First generation geopolitical thinkers were quite influential in the dissemination of the idea that geography is destiny.

To make sure that the United States maintains its hegemonic role in global politics and China does not ascend to regional hegemony status in Asia, Trump administration is now pursuing a containment policy. Not only the scope of American military deployment to the region widened but also the United States is now doing its best to ensure the emergence of an anti-Chinese block. Both the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Imitative and the so-called Quad Initiative aim at bringing into existence a counter-Chinese power block by pushing the traditional American allies in the region to gear up their military expenditures and improve security cooperation among them. Quad members are the United States, Japan, India and Australia. The United States strongly disputes China’s sovereignty claims in the East and South China Seas and it has noticeably increased the frequency of its naval operations there.

The second generation of geopolitical studies came to the fore following the end of the Second World War. Throughout the long Cold war years, the US-led Western camp was in bitter ideological competition with the Soviet Union-led eastern camp.The major faultiness between the two opposing power blocks was ideological. The parties competed with each other as to whose political-economic model would triumph across the globe. Ideology and identity were the main signifiers of their geopolitical competition. This era in geopolitical studies is also called ideological geopolitics.

Third generation geopolitics began with the end of the Cold War rivalry between two opposing power blocks adopting diverging political ideologies. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the unification of Germany in 1990 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 epitomized the end of ideological geopolitics.

Third generation geopolitics began with the end of the Cold War rivalry between two opposing power blocks adopting diverging political ideologies.Since the early 1990s till the end of the first decade of the twenty first century, analysts observed the rise of a new geopolitical understanding being defined by many as a new world order. New world order geopolitics suggested that there was only one super power all over the world and all other states would gain influence in international politics in relation to the status of their relationship with the global hegemony. That sole superpower happened to be the United States. There was a huge power gap between the United States and all other countries and it was nearly impossible for any country, acting alone or in cooperation with others, to counterbalance the American hegemony. Hence, bandwagon appears to have replaced balancing in the age American primacy in global politics.

The revised security strategy of the European Union (issued in the summer of the 2016), and the first national security strategy of the Trump administration (issued in December 2017) demonstrate that western powers feel threatened by the rise of non-western powers.The last decade has witnessed the rise of populist and illiberal political movements in key western countries. The internal criticism of liberal democratic practices has severely affected the attractiveness of a liberal world order. As the Brexit decision in the United Kingdom and the election of Donald Trump to presidency in the United States demonstrate, the forces of illiberalism, populism, protectionism, and xenophobia have gained ground in key western countries. During the last decade, long-term identity based alliance relationships have been replaced with short-term, pragmatic, and issue-oriented strategic partnerships. In today’s world, countries of different value orientations, geographical locations, power capabilities, and threat perceptions are no longer bound to define each other categorically as enemies or friends. The notion of ‘frenemy’ has already become an identity signifier in interstate relations.

One important characteristic of China’s rise relates to its continental size and huge population.Another key characteristic of China’s rise is that despite all counter allegations that Chinese foreign policy has turned out to become more assertive and aggressive over the last decade Chinese leaders seem to have been following a low key foreign policy orientation by avoiding rigid positions on global issues unless core national interests are at stake, such as the status of Taiwan, Tibet, Uighur region, South China Sea and East China Sea. However, today’s China is not pursuing a strategy of global hegemony. Defining their empire-state as the Middle Kingdom, Chinese rulers have never adopted an imperial mission whose essential logic was to help transform others in China’s image.

Power is residual because being powerful requires a particular state to possess both some capabilities, of both tangible and intangible sorts, and the will to use them in order to have an impact on others. Without those capabilities at the first instance and the will in the background, it is nearly impossible to influence others. Tangible sources are those that can be quantified, measured, observed and categorized. Such sources are military capability, economic might, geographical location, population number, human development, technological prowess, environmental factors, and etc. Intangible sources of power are those that cannot be easily observed, tested or measured. Values, norms, societal cohesion, culture, image and identity are typical examples of intangible power capabilities.

Harfold J. Mackinder, a geographer in the United Kingdom, is considered to be the first important geopolitical thinker.

Unlike Mackinder, Alfred Mahan, a military historian in the United States, argued that the road to global primacy in international politics would go through mastering oceans and other sea lines.

In Mahan’s thinking, controlling sea traffic through a powerful navy would absolve the United States of taking direct control of other countries.

Turkey would simply connect the energy thirsty European Union members to energy abundant countries in the Caucasus, Central Asia and Middle East.

President Trump has defined the rise of China as the number one geopolitical challenge levelled against American primacy in
global politics.

Third generation geopolitics began with the end of the Cold War rivalry between two opposing power blocks adopting diverging political ideologies. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the unification of Germany in 1990 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 epitomized the end of ideological geopolitics.

Fukuyama was basically saying that from the dissolution of the Soviet Union onwards the erstwhile non-capitalist societies would gradually become part of the US-led liberal capitalist world order because the end of the Cold War left them only with this option.

Power relations determine purchasing value of geopolitical understandings.

Coercive powers try to instill fear on their targets and wish them to respond out of necessity.

Persuasive soft powers are those that think they need to invest some capital in order to help create legitimacy and attraction in the eyes of others.

According to Montevideo Convention which sets out the parameters of a state spells out four aspects for a political entity to be properly called a state: defined territory, permanent people, centralized authority and sovereignty. The correct answer is A.

Globalization refers to links tying nations of the world together. The correct answer is B.

Samuel Huntington (1996) argued that a potential clash between major civilizations replaced the ideological rivalry during the Cold War. Huntington’s famous clash of civilizations argument suggests that ideology is no longer the source of conflicts and disputes in interstate politics which would be from now on characterized by the disagreements associated with desires for domination by different civilizations. The correct answer is C.

The End of History thesis offered by Francis Fukuyama holds that the battle between major ideologies ended with the obvious victory of liberal democracy, suggesting that the liberal values are the ultimate achievement of mankind. The answer is D.

Particular strands of geopolitics are the geopolitics of oil, the geopolitics of religion, the geopolitics of water, the geopolitics of propaganda and the geopolitics of the internet. The answer is E.